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Monday, March 15, 2010
Supreme Court Syllabi Bloate v. United States No. 08-728 Date Argued October 06, 2010 Decided March 08, 2010 Opinion Author: Thomas The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (Act) requires a criminal defendant's trial to commence within 70 days of his indictment or initial appearance, 18 U. S. C. §3161(c)(1), and entitles him to dismissal of the charges if that deadline is not met, §3162(a)(2). As relevant here, the Act automatically excludes from the 70-day period 'delay resulting from ... proceedings concerning the defendant," 18 U. S. C. A. §3161(h)(1) (hereinafter subsection (h)(1)), and separately permits a district court to exclude "delay resulting from a continuance" it grants, provided the court makes findings required by §3161(h)(7) (hereinafter subsection (h)(7)). Petitioner's indictment on federal firearm and drug possession charges started the 70-day clock on August 24, 2006. After petitioner's arraignment, the Magistrate Judge ordered the parties to file pretrial motions by September 13. On September 7, the court granted petitioner's motion to extend that deadline, but on the new due date, September 25, petitioner waived his right to file pretrial motions. On October 4, the Magistrate Judge found the waiver voluntary and intelligent. Over the next three months, petitioner's trial was delayed several times, often at petitioner's instigation. On February 19, 2007-179 days after he was indicted-he moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the Act's 70-day limit had elapsed. In denying the motion, the District Court excluded the time from September 7 through October 4 as pretrial motion preparation time. At trial, petitioner was found guilty on both counts and sentenced to concurrent prison terms. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss, holding that the period from September 7 through October 4 was automatically excludable from the 70-day limit under subsection (h)(1). Continue reading Bloate v. United States ... =========================================================================================== Johnson v. United States No. 08-6295 Date Argued October 06, 2009 Decided March 02, 2010 Opinion Author: Scalia Petitioner Johnson pleaded guilty to possession of ammunition by a convicted felon. 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1). The Government sought sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, which authorizes an enhanced penalty for a person who violates §922(g) and who "has three previous convictions" for "a violent felony," §924(e)(1), defined as, inter alia, an offense that "has as an element the use ... of physical force against the person of another," §924(e)(2)(B)(i). Among the three prior felony convictions the Government proffered was Johnson's 2003 Florida conviction for simple battery, which ordinarily is a first-degree misdemeanor, Fla. Stat. §784.03(1)(b), but was a felony conviction for Johnson because he had previously been convicted of another battery, Fla. Stat. §784.03(2). Under Florida law, a battery occurs when a person either "[a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against [his] will," or "[i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to another person." §784.03(1)(a). Nothing in the record permitted the District Court to conclude that Johnson's 2003 conviction rested upon the "strik[ing]" or "[i]ntentionally caus[ing] bodily harm" elements of the offense. Accordingly, his conviction was a predicate conviction for a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act only if "[a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing]" another constitutes the use of "physical force" under §924(e)(2)(B)(i). Concluding it does, the District Court enhanced Johnson's sentence under §924(e)(1), sentencing him to a term of 15 years and 5 months. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Continue reading Johnson v. United States ...

Friday, February 26, 2010
Supreme Court Syllabi Maryland v. Shatzer No. 08-680 Date Argued October 5, 2009 Decided February 24, 2010 Opinion Author: Scalia ========================================================================================= In 2003, a police detective tried to question respondent Shatzer, who was incarcerated at a Maryland prison pursuant to a prior conviction, about allegations that he had sexually abused his son. Shatzer invoked his Miranda right to have counsel present during interrogation, so the detective terminated the interview. Shatzer was released back into the general prison population, and the investigation was closed. Another detective reopened the investigation in 2006 and attempted to interrogate Shatzer, who was still incarcerated. Shatzer waived his Miranda rights and made inculpatory statements. The trial court refused to suppress those statements, reasoning that Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, did not apply because Shatzer had experienced a break in Miranda custody prior to the 2006 interrogation. Shatzer was convicted of sexual child abuse. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the mere passage of time does not end the Edwards protections, and that, assuming, arguendo, a break-in-custody exception to Edwards existed, Shatzer's release back into the general prison population did not constitute such a break. Continue reading 'Maryland v Shatzer' ...

Monday, February 22, 2010
Supreme Court Syllabi Wilkins v. Gaddy No. 08-10914 Decided February 22, 2010 Opinion Author: Per Curiam ========================================================================================== ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT Per Curiam. In Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1, 4 (1992), this Court held that "the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] when the inmate does not suffer serious injury." In this case, the District Court dismissed a prisoner's excessive force claim based entirely on its determination that his injuries were " de minimis." Because the District Court's approach, affirmed on appeal, is at odds with Hudson's direction to decide excessive force claims based on the nature of the force rather than the extent of the injury, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment is reversed. Continue reading 'Wilkins v. Gaddy' ... Thaler v. Haynes No. 09-273 Decided February 22, 2010 Opinion Author: Per Curiam ========================================================================================== ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Per Curiam. This case presents the question whether any decision of this Court "clearly establishes" that a judge, in ruling on an objection to a peremptory challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), must reject a demeanor-based explanation for the challenge unless the judge personally observed and recalls the aspect of the prospective juror's demeanor on which the explanation is based. The Court of Appeals appears to have concluded that either Batson itself or Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U. S. 472 (2008), clearly established such a rule, but the Court of Appeals read far too much into those decisions, and its holding, if allowed to stand, would have important implications. We therefore grant the petition for certiorari, grant respondent's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Continue reading Thaler v. Haynes ...

Friday, January 22, 2010
Supreme Court News Updates Judges CAN Disagree with the Career Offender Guideline Today, the Supreme Court GVR'd Vazquez v. United States (Case No. 09-5370), an 11th Circuit case.  Judge Presnell originally sentenced Vazquez to 110 months' incarceration, down from the 210-262 month range for the career offender guideline.  The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding the sentence procedurally unreasonable because it rested on the district court's "disagreement with the guidelines, which was impermissible." At resentencing, J. Presnell found that "it may be" that the career offender guideline "is immune from the policy criticisms otherwise permissible" because the crack guidelines involved an "implied congressional policy" while the career offender guideline "is a product of direct congressional expression."  The court resentenced Mr. Vazquez to 180 months' imprisonment, concluding: "[I]f I were allowed to consider what I consider to be the unjust application of 4B1.1 in this case, I would impose a sentence lower than 180 months." On appeal (by Mr. Vazquez), the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court's refusal to consider its policy disagreement with the career offender guideline was not procedurally unreasonable.  The court believed itself bound by United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2006), which held that the district court impermissibly ignored congressional policy by generally disagreeing with the career offender guideline.  The court stated that district courts may vary from guidelines based on policy disagreements only "where Sentencing Commission policy judgment, not Congressional direction, underlies the Guideline at issue,'" and "'where that policy judgment did not arise from the Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role.'" Vazquez sought rehearing en banc.  In his petition, Mr. Vazquez showed that the Eleventh Circuit was alone in its position (as none of the cases cited by the court really supported its position).  Additionally, Mr. Vazquez cited to the fact that the Solicitor General had taken a position inconsistent with the Eleventh Circuit's opinion.  The Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing. In his petition for writ of certiorari, Mr. Vazquez reiterated the points raised in his petition for rehearing.  The Solicitor General agreed that the Eleventh Circuit opinion was wrong, and asked that the Supreme Court remand the case to the Eleventh Circuit so it could affirmatively know the Solicitor General's position.  Today, the Supreme Court granted cert, vacated the Eleventh Circuit opinion, and remanded for further proceedings based on the Solicitor General's position. Carrying a Concealed Weapon Not a Violent Felony In Hunter v. United States (Case No. 09-122), the S Ct GVR'd another case from the 11th Circuit.  Hunter was sentenced to 188 months as an Armed Career Criminal, based in part on two prior convictions for carrying a concealed weapon.  To make another long procedural story short, the Solicitor General agreed that Hunter's claim (on a 2255) presented a "substantial showing" that his sentence under the ACCA, in light of Begay and Archer, violated due process because it was in excess of the ten-year statutory maximum otherwise applicable in 18 U.S.C. 922(g) cases.  And today the Supreme Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit's order denying Hunter's certificate of appealability and remanded "for further consideration in light of the position asserted by the Solicitor General in her brief."  Hunter v. United States, No. 09-122 (Jan. 19, 2010).

Tuesday, January 19, 2010
Supreme Court Syllabi Presley v. Georgia No. 09-5270 Decided January 19, 2010 Opinion Author: Per Curiam ================================================================================= ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA Per Curiam. After a jury trial in the Superior Court of DeKalb County, Georgia, petitioner Eric Presley was convicted of a cocaine trafficking offense. The conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. 285 Ga. 270, 674 S. E. 2d 909 (2009). Presley seeks certiorari, claiming his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a public trial was violated when the trial court excluded the public from the voir dire of prospective jurors. The Supreme Court of Georgia's affirmance contravened this Court's clear precedents. Certiorari and petitioner's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are now granted, and the judgment is reversed. Continue reading Presley v. Georgia ... Wellons v. Hall No. 09-5731 Decided January 19, 2010 Opinion Author: Per Curiam ================================================================================= ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Per Curiam. From beginning to end, judicial proceedings conducted for the purpose of deciding whether a defendant shall be put to death must be conducted with dignity and respect. The disturbing facts of this case raise serious questions concerning the conduct of the trial, and this petition raises a serious question about whether the Court of Appeals carefully reviewed those facts before addressing petitioners constitutional claims. We know that the Court of Appeals committed the same procedural error that we corrected in Cone v. Bell, 556 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 1718). We do not know how the court would have ruled if it had the benefit of our decision in that case. Continue reading Wellons v. Hall ...